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FRANCHISE RESTRICTIONS:
"TIED" SALES AND TERRITORIAL
LIMITATIONS*
ALAN S. WARDt
When Senator Hart announced early last year that the Senate
Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee would begin an inquiry into
distribution problems, he noted recent concern about "enforce-
ment policy which appears inconsistent with the philosophy of the
antitrust law."' Opening hearings on March 2, 1965, he focused
particularly on "sometimes chaotic legal situations" involving con-
tractual restraints in franchising agreements and the "differing
ideas... the Trade Commission and the Justice Department [and]
the district courts seem to have ... on how these restraints should be
treated under the antitrust laws." Senator Hart questioned the appli-
cability of per se rules in the franchising field, and whether legal tests
should "be the same for the small as the large.
' 2
There has been controversy over whether strict antitrust rules
should be applied to certain restrictive distribution practices for at
least 26o years, particularly when "small business" conduct has been
questioned.3 But it is doubtful that differences between courts and
the enforcement agencies over the substance of relevant antitrust
rules have been decisive in much of the recent litigation.4 Though
*This paper is a revised and up-dated version of a Speech made on March 5,
1965, to the Antitrust Section of the Michigan State Bar Association.
tPartner, Hollabaugh & Jacobs, Washington, D. C. Former Assistant Chief of
Special Litigation Section, U.S. Department of Justice. A.B. 1952, Wesleyan Univer-
sity, J.D. 1955, University of Chicago.
"Senate Antitrust and Monoply Subcommittee Press Release, January 28, 1965.
'Hearings on Distribution Problems Affecting Small Business Before the Anti-
trust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 Franchising Agreements, at 2 (1965). Hampered by uncertainty,
the businessman who turns to "franchising in ... [an] attempt to compete with
the vertically integrated ... corporate giants," Senator Hart felt, may be "caught
in the middle," without "the funds to fight the enforcement agencies or set up an
independent distribution system" while he "is in a competitive battle for survival
against those who do and have." Ibid.
8See Timberg, "Territorial Exclusives," Address before the ABA Antitrust
Section, August 8, 1965.
'Most disagreement between the Commission or the Antitrust Division and
the courts about application of antitrust rules to specific restraints, e.g., in United
States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1965), prob. juris. noted
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the scope and nature of restrictions, the enforcement methods and
the products and services involved under franchising arrangements
are of almost infinite variety, all pose rather familiar antitrust
variables. The considerable body of litigated cases testing contractual
restraints designed to foster "orderly marketing" have developed
reasonably well defined standards for distribution practices,5 and
those standards, for the most part, apply equally to franchising.6
Difficult and important questions, even so, complicate and con-
ceivably may frustrate efforts by businessmen and the enforcement
agencies to judge fairly the permissible range of conduct within fran-
chise arrangements. It is likely, of course, that Senator Hart's con-
tinuing investigation will provide a better insight into the general
impact franchise restrictions have on competition. More immediately,
we expect significant clarification of some rules applicable to franchis-
ing from the U.S. Supreme Court this term.7 Of perhaps broader im-
pact, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice is ready-
ing "guidelines" reflecting that agency's conclusions concerning some
aspects of proper franchising behavior. According to Assistant Attorney
General Turner, "careful study" is being given to "the problem of
382 U.S. 936 (1965); Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); and Snap-On
Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963), has seemingly been generated
by contrary appraisals of the evidence. Such uncertainty derives from the pos-
sibility that facts may be variously interpreted, an uncertainty characteristic
of any situation where business or any other human conduct must be judged
by legal norms. Even well marked price-fixing doctrine admits such uncertainties.
Who can say that a businessman's nervous tic at hearing his competitor mention
a price may not be thought by some future jury to be the "knowing wink" of a
conspirator? See, Esco Corp. v. United States, 341 F.2d ooo (gth Cir. 1965). An
observation made by counsel for the International Franchise Association in his
January 16, 1965 Address to that Association summarizing antitrust developments
puts this problem in good perspective. Quoting Mr. Justice Holmes, he said "Cer-
tainty generally is an illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man." His address
is reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, at 467.
'See e.g., Jones, Control of Distributors' Activities, 26 A.B.A. Antitrust Section
68 (1964); Robinson, Providing for Orderly Marketing of Goods, 15 A.B.A. Antitrust
Section 282 (1959); Stewart, Exclusive Franchises and Territorial Confinement of
Distributors, 22 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 33 (1963); Note, Restricted Channels of
Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 795 (1962).
"This is not to say that distinctive attributes of the franchising concept may
not affect traditional antitrust analysis _ f particular restraints, as for instance,
where "suggested retail prices" for "national advertising" are utilized within a
trademark-based franchise. See e.g., Final Judgment in United States v. Spring-Air
Co. (N.D. Ill., Aug. 16, 1962), 1962 CGH Tr. Cas. 70,402.
'United States v. Arnold Schwinn 8: Co., supra note 4; United States v. General
Motors Corp., 234 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Cal. 1964), 1964 CCH Tr. Cas. 71,250, prob. juris.
noted 38o U.S. 94o (1965) (No. 820), argument presented Dec. 9, 1965; United States
v. Sealy, 1964 CCH Tr. Cas. 71,258 (N.D. 111. 1964), prob. juris. noted 382 U.S. 8o6
(1965) (No. 238).
1966]
68 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol.XXIII
territorial restrictions on dealers." Believing that the Justice Depart-
ment's enforcement "role can only be performed satisfactorily by a
constant preoccupation with the formulation of legal rules," Mr.
Turner has announced his intention to publish "the Government's
views" on this subject, thus inspiring "a continuing dialogue among
the Government, the bar, business groups and the academic profes-
sion" that will "speed.. up the processes of development of the
law." 8
It is timely, therefore, to comment on some generdl propositions
tested in recent litigation bearing on two main types of restriction:
First, limitations which restrict the sources from which a franchisee
may purchase; and, Second, territorial restrictions. Either type of re-
striction can be vertical or horizontal-that is, imposed by a franchisor
upon its francisees, or adopted by agreement of francisees, perhaps
with the franchisor's encouragement or assistance. Horizontal arrange-
ments characteristically involve the greater antitrust peril.9
I.
PURCHASE RESTRICTIONS
The Carvel'° litigation provides a jumping-off point for considera-
tion of restrictions preventing a franchisee from purchasing business
supplies from other than the franchisor or franchisor-specified sources.
Plaintiffs (franchisees) in the private treble-damage case charged that
Carvel's requirement that they purchase certain supplies (the ice
cream mix, cones, and other ingredients of the end product sold
8Address by Donald F. Turner, American Bar Association Antitrust Section
Meeting, August 1o, 1965.
'There is some merit in the argument that the effect of a restraint is the same
regardless of whether horizontally or vertically adopted. On the other hand,
there are some real differences. Horizontal territorial allocations, for instance,
are far more likely to eliminate intra-brand competition and are normally so
intended, while vertically set territories may primarily serve the franchisor's market
development purposes [see the discussion of the White case, infra] and, even though
discouraging cross-selling, usually will not completely shut off intra-brand compe-
tition. In many areas of antitrust, "the effect of a transaction is not dispositive of
its legality." Robinson, supra note 5, at 296. The circumstances under which a
vertical arrangement may be viewed as, or actually become, horizontal have been
much disputed in arguments to the Supreme Court in United States v. Scaly, supra
note 7; and United States v. General Motors, supra note 7.
"Susser v. Carvel, 2o6 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964); after argument certiorari dismissed as
improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965). The Federal Trade Commission attacked
essentially the same conduct, Carvel Corp., Docket 8574, but dismissed its own
complaint on July 19, 1965.
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to the public) from Carvel through Carvel-approved sources was an
unlawful tie-in sale.31 The district court, trying the case on the basis
of a pre-trial stipulation that plaintiffs relief only on per se violations
shown in certain written agreements and other documents, dismissed
the tie-in charge, and was affirmed by a divided court of appeals.
The appeals court noted that Carvel-franchised stores, which num-
bered about i8o in 1954, by 1962 totaled approximately 400 and were
located "throughout the eastern ... United States from Maine to
Florida and as far west as Wisconsin." Annual gross sales by fran-
chisees ranged "from six to eight million dollars" while "Carvel's sales
to the stores of supplies, equipment, and machinery reached a high
point of $5,532,396 in 1957 and in 196o totaled $4,46o,689.12
The court split on the "tying" issue. Judge Lumbard, who wrote
the majority opinion on all aspects save that point, felt that it "is
the lease or license of the trademark itself, buttressed by this array
of patents and subsidiary trademarks, to which are tied the other
products."' 3 Carvel thus had sufficient economic power under its
trademarks to appreciably restrain free competition for the "tied"
products,' 4 and since plaintiffs had evidenced the essentials of a tying
arrangement, in Judge Lumbard's view, it was up to Carvel thencefor-
ward to justify the "tie" as reasonably necessary to protect its trade-
mark. Unsatisfied with the record on this point, he would have re-
manded to give Carrel the chance to prove that specifications for
substitute productg would be so complex and detailed as to make it
impracticable for Carvel to establish such specifications. He emphasiz-
"The litigation involved several other charges. Plaintiffs' charge of fraudulent
misrepresentation in the franchise negotiations was dismissed after a lengthy
trial before the court without a jury. In addition to tie-in, the antitrust charges
included allegations that Carvel had unlawfully fixed the prices of the retail
products sold in the franchised stores and prevented franchisees from selling
other items at the franchised outlet, e.g., hamburgers. The district court held that
Carvel's pre-1955 franchise agreements did involve unlawful price maintenance, a
feature eliminated by a 1955 amendment to the agreements, and dismissed the
complaint on all other counts.
-'Susser v. Carvel, supra note 1o, at 5o9.
2 1d. at 513.
"4As Judge Lumbard saw it: "In short, in order to secure the benefits of em-
ploying the Carvel name on his retail products, the dealer has been forced to sur-
render his right to negotiate with suppliers of his own choice on matters such as
price, delivery and other aspects of a contract of sale. Where such a surrender may
be traced to the economic leverage of the other party, arising from its trademark,
the elements of an unlawful tying arrangement have been established. Certainly
the amount of commerce here involved is not insubstantial, in light of Carvel's
sales to the franchise dealers in ig6o alone of $3,965,923 in ingredients and other
supplies." Id. at 514.
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ed that tied ingredients other than the secret mix, though made to
specifications, were available elsewhere, and pointed to Engbrecht v.
Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714 (D. Kan. 1962), where the record
showed that Dairy Queen, with a nationwide chain of some 3,400
soft ice cream franchise stores, had established specifications to govern
its franchisees' purchases of mix and other ingredients but did not
require its dealers to purchase such items directly from it or from
other approved sources.15
Judges Friendly and Medina, however, were satisfied that the pre-
trial order limiting plaintiffs' case to per se violations foreclosed re-
covery on the tie-in theory. Tying arrangements, they pointed out,
"'are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has suffi-
cient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably
restrain free competition in the market for the tied product and a
"not insubstantial" amount of commerce is affected.' "16 Plaintiffs'
case met neither test. Noting their view that a patent was but "prima
facie," i.e., rebuttable, "evidence of 'market control," they held that
the Carvel trademark had not acquired "such prominence ... [as]
would satisfy the market dominance test of Times-Picayune and North-
ern Pacific." Second, excluding the dollar volume of secret mix sold to
the franchisees which "could legally be tied to the Carrel trade-mark if
that mark was to retain its significance," the "minor" amount of al-
legedly tied sales revealed the "'insubstantiality' of the commerce
affected."1 7 Finally, the majority was convinced that the record sup-
ported the District Judge's finding that specifying standards for the
Carvel ingredients would be an unreasonable burden, particularly
when "something so insusceptible of precise verbalization as the
desired texture and taste of an ice cream cone" is at issue.1 8
Considering basically identical charges, but after full evidentiary
hearings under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 45), the Federal Trade Commission dismissed its complaint against
Carvel,1 9 reversing the Hearing Examiner who had found a violation
aLIn Engbrecht, plaintiffs' complaint that Dairy Queen tied the freezer to sales
of the finished products was rejected by the Court because "plaintiffs evidence falls
short of showing any other type of freezer which would produce a product satis-
fying defendant's standard for quality." 203 F. Supp. 714, 719.
"Susser v. Carvel, supra note so, at 518. [citing Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).]
'Id. at 519 and 521.
aIsd. at 52o. That a competitor, whose mix is not made under a secret formula,
may be satisfied by less exacting standards seemed of little force to the majority.
"In the Matter of Carvel Corp., Docket 8574, Opinion of the Commission,
July i9, 1965.
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on facts similar to those cited by Judge Lumbard.2 0 At the outset, Com-
missioner Jones emphasized that the Commission found it "conceptual-
ly impossible... to view a license to use a trademark as separate and
distinct from the sale of the trademarked product or its ingredient....
Since Carvel's franchise for the sale of Carvel products and its license
to use are part of a single package, we conclude that.., the Carvel
franchise agreements were [not] illegal tie-in arrangements."2 1 To the
contrary, "Carvel's restrictions on its dealers' sources of supply of mix
and commissary items" were lawful "ancillary" restraints under the
Addyston Pile doctrine, being imposed "as a valid and reasonable ex-
ercise of the legitimate business interests of the trademark owner in
protecting his mark and insuring the quality of his product."22 More-
over, the Commission agreed with the Second Circuit majority that
maintaining the quality of its soft ice cream by less restrictive mea-
sures, such as designating specifications, was not shown to be practi-
cal. Even viewing the arrangement "in the nature of ... a tie," Commis-
sioner Jones, like Judges Medina and Friendly, found no evidence,
either that Carvel "possesses the requisite dominance or economic
power in the soft ice cream business"' or that a "not insubstantial
amount of commerce in the tied products ... [was] affected."24
Different, but related, problems were involved in Atlantic Refin-
ing Co. v. FTC,25 decided by the Supreme Court last term. The Court
affirmed a Seventh Circuit judgment upholding Federal Trade Com-
mission orders under §5 of the FTC Act barring Atlantic and the
Goodyear Tire 1k Rubber Co. from continuing a joint sales promo-
"Docket 8574, Initial Decision, May 25, 1964. The Examiner held (i) the Carvel
franchise to be the "tying product," (2) that the franchisor thus had "sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product appreciably to restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product," and (3) "that a not insubstantial
amount of interstate commerce is affected."
2 Docket 8574, Opinion of the Commission, supra note 19, 3 CCH Tr. Reg.
Rep. 17,298. "No property right inheres in a trademark grant from the
product or service to which it relates," Commissioner Jones noted, whereas "tie-in
arrangements must involve two separable and distinct products...."
wIbid.
2Ibid. Carvel was but one among "numerous other franchise chains and inde-
pendent operators."
- Ibid. Though the record suggested that Carvel held 37% of the total soft ice
cream business in the relevant market area, the "virtual absence of barriers to entry
into this business," and the dearth of facts showing the significance of Carvel
licensees as market outlets for mix-supplying dairies, convinced the Commission that
Carvel's market share percentage alone was meaningless.
n38 1 U.S. 357 (965), affirming 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964); affirming 58 FTC 309
(ig6i).
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tion program.26 In essence, the forbidden sales commission plan had
provided for Atlantic to be paid a commission for "sponsoring" the
sale of Goodyear tires, batteries and accessories (TBA) to those of At-
lantic's wholesale dealers and retail service stations located in three
sales regions; Atlantic's similar sales commission contract with Fire-
stone covering three other sales regions was not directly attacked in the
action.
Though "the Goodyear-Atlantic contract is not a tying arrange-
ment,"27 Mr. Justice Clark acknowledged, "the central competitive
characteristic" of the Atlantic-Goodyear plan is the same as a "tie"-
"the utilization of economic power in one market to curtail compe-
tition in another."28 And there was, the Court found, "substantial evi-
dence" of Atlantic's "economic leverage": Atlantic's "lease and equip-
ment loan contracts with their cancellation and short-term provis-
ions...; Atlantic controlled the supply of gasoline and oil to its
wholesalers and dealers ... [and had] extensive control of all ad-
vertising on the premises of its dealers." 29 In sum, Atlantic and its
dealers "simply do not bargain as equals."30 Evidence that Atlantic
employed overt coercive tactics in sponsoring Goodyear TBA "bol-
stered" the "lever" which resulted from Atlantic's economic power
over its distributors and dealers. The results, as shown by the
record, were that "wholesalers and manufacturers of competing
' Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC was one of three companion cases challenging
sales commission arrangements between major rubber companies and major oil
companies. The other two are: Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 58 FTC 371 (g6l), in-
volving Firestone and Shell Oil Co. (now on appeal in the Fifth Circuit); B. F.
Goodrich Co. - FTC - Docket 6485; Opinion of the Commission, January 14,
1966, involving Goodrich and Texaco. In each, the Commission held the sales com-
mission plan unlawful, finding the "competitive effects of the... plan ... like those
of an unlawful tying arrangement-... a classic example of the use of economic
power in one market (here, gasoline distribution) to destroy competition in another
market (TBA distribution)"-affecting a "not unsubstantial" amount of commerce.
58 FTC 367; 58 FTC 4o6. The Goodrich-Texaco proceeding is procedurally more
complicated, but the Commission's 1966 Opinion cites the same defects as fatal to all.
Use of sales commission plans is widespread. Goodyear had similar agreements with
21 oil companies (381 U.S. 357, 373); Goodrich and Firestone likewise had such
arrangements with a substantial number of oil marketers.
"Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, supra note 25, at 369. For, the Court noted,
"Atlantic is not required to tie its sale of gasoline and other petroleum products
to purchases of Goodyear tires, batteries and accessories. Nor does it expressly require
such purchases of its dealers."
wIbid.
'Id. at 368. The Seventh Circuit observed that the "service station dealer is
more of an economic serf than a businessman free to purchase the TBA of his
choice." 331 F.-d 394, 400. Cf. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), cited by
Mr. Justice Clark at this point in his discussion.
m1381 U.S. at 368.
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brands... were foreclosed from the Atlantic market; ... Firestone and
Goodyear were excluded from selling to Atlantic's dealers in each
others territories;... [and] Atlantic wholesalers and retailers ... were
effectively foreclosed from selling brands other than Goodyear... [and]
could buy only at Goodyear's price."3' The Court saw no need for
"extensive economic analysis" of the plan's "competitive effect... [in]
the entire [TBA] market... ," and approved the Commission's rejec-
tion of evidence of "economic justification of the program."
"[J]ust as the effect of this plan is similar to that of a tie-in, so
it is unnecessary to embark upon a full-scale economic analysis
of competitive effect. We think it enough that the Commission
found that a not unsubstantial portion of commerce is affect-
ed." 3
2
The Commission's Order, barring any use of sales-commission plans
by either Atlantic or Goodyear with any other company, Mr. Justice
Clark held, was "well within the ambit of the Commission's authori-
ty."33 Both "worked together to achieve the program's success," Good-
year "harnessing and utilizing" Atlantic's power.3 4
Thus, Carvel and Atlantic came to opposite conclusions. For what
Carvel may require its franchisors to do-buy from it or approved
sources-Atlantic may not recommend to its dealers. The pragmatic
explanation for the variant results may be the difference between oil
and ice cream. A more useful answer may be suggested by reviewing
some general principles consistent with both cases, against the back-
ground of prior "tie-in" decisions.
First, the "tying" doctrine is elastic, perhaps especially expansive
in § 5 litigation. Neither Carvel nor Atlantic involved the typical
"tie," but both Courts used "tying" rules because the practice was
"like" a tying arrangement. It is noteworthy, too, that the Commis-
sion's Carvel opinion, though conceptually rejecting the "tying-trade-
mark" analysis, even so measured the evidence against "tying" stand-
ards.
Second, a factual inquiry into the franchisor's "economic power"
is the key to whether a franchisor can lawfully restrict his franchisee's
-Id. at 370.
1Id. at 371. Goodyear and Firestone sales in five years exceeded $5o million.
3Id. at 373.
3id. at 373. Goodyear urged that there was "no evidence of the economic power
of many of the companies with which it has sales commission plans," in protesting
the scope of the FTC's Order. The Court noted, however, that Goodyear could "seek
a reopening of the order" if it "has . .a contract with ... a company ... not pos-
sessed of economic power over ... [its] dealers."
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freedom of purchase. Evidencing only the franchise relationship, even
if it is trademark-based, will not meet plaintiff's burden of proof on
this issue. Use of a patent to restrict a franchisee-licensor's purchases
of "tied" products may or may not be conclusively barred.3 5
Third, the opinions in Atlantic (and the Commission's opinion in
Goodrich) suggest that proof of the "utilization" of economic leverage
"in one market to curtail competition in another,"3 6 i.e., the actual
"tie," may be satisfied by evidencing something less than an express
(or inferred) agreement, or other form of overt coercion. Whether
"recommendation is tantamount to command," as the Seventh Circuit
said in Atlantic, 37 will likely be straightened out if either Goodrich or
Texaco appeals the Commission's Orders just issued against them.38
Fourth, per se assertions will not substitute for the required factual
showings of "economic power" and a "not insubstantial" amount of
affected commerce. To paraphrase Mr. Alfred Perlman, the per se
doctrine should not be used as a drunk uses a lamp post-more to lean
on than for illumination. 39 The per se approach may serve some pur-
pose, however, in showing the point at which factual inquiry may be
terminated, i.e., it may eliminate the need for either "full-scale eco-
nomic analysis of competitive effect" or evidence of "economic justi-
fication" for the challenged conduct.4 0 In a different context, even
this use of per se might be unwarranted.41
Fifth, a franchisor can control his franchisee's purchases by estab-
lishing reasonable specifications for products reasonably related to pro-
tection of the franchisor's good will. If a trademark license is involved,
the burden of showing the need for protection of ihe franchisor's
good will is reduced, because Section 5 of the Lanham Act 42 requires
the licensor of the mark to exercise control of "the nature and quality
5Cf. Susser v. Carvel, 332 F.2d 505, 519 (2d Cir. 1964); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958) (dissent); Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 307 (1949).
wAtlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, supra note 25, at 369.
'Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, supra note 25, 331 F.2d at 401.
'B. F. Goodrich, Docket 6485, supra note 26.
3Quoted in the Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1966, p. 14.
'Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, supra note 25, at 371.
"Note, in this connection, the assertions by the International Franchise Asso-
ciation, Inc., appearing before the Supreme Court as amicus curiae in Susser v.
Carvel, that extension of per se rules to "...franchising arrangements could be
ruinous...and [could] jeopardize the continuation of a method of business oper-
ation which has proven valuable and effective throughout the country." IFA
Amicus Brief, p.2.
'5 U.S.C. § 1055.
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of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used." 43
Sixth, in the usual situation, "specification of the type and quality
of the product to be used... is protection enough [for the manu-
facturer's] ... good will"44 and limiting the franchisee to purchases
from the franchisor or franchisor-approved sources will pass muster
"only... where specifications for a substitute would be so detailed
that they could not practicably be supplied."4 5
Finally, a secret formula likely will justify requiring a franchisee
to buy materials so prepared from the franchisor, but the bona fides
of the "secret" formulation and other factors of its use, including the
significance of the secret to the unique quality of the end product
sold to the public, are proper subjects for judicial inquiry.
46
Restricting a franchisee's freedom of purchase, even if the. fran-
chisee must buy from his franchisor, is not unlawful. Rather, to the
extent it is directed to maintaining quality control and protecting the
franchisor's good will, such a restriction may engender competition.
Equally apparent, however, is that such restraints can be used to frus-
trate competition. Nevertheless, in most situations, guided by "rule-of-
reason" standards, it is possible to make fairly precise judgments




In general, territorial limitations prescribed by the franchisor in-
volve less well defined antitrust questions than "tying" restrictions
do, partly because the restrictiveness of the limitations imposed varies
significantly in different franchises and industries, and partly because
§ 45 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1127) so defines the control requirement
under which a "related company[s]" use of a mark is permitted under § 5 (15 U.S.C.
§ 1o55) without "affect[ing] the validity of such mark or of its registration." Cf.
Morse-Starrett Products Co. v. Steccone, 86 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1949); duPont v.
Celanese Corp., 167 F.2d 484 (C.C.P.A. [Patents] 1948).
"Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 35, at 3o6. But see Denison Mat-
tress Factory v. The Spring-Air Co., 3o8 F.2d 403 (5 th Cir. 1962), holding specifi-
cation of sources not unreasonable on facts there shown.
'Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 35, at 306.
OThat specifications for the "secret" formulation have, in fact, been made
available to approved companies also will bear on the reasonableness of source
restrictions.
'7An interesting case raising related issues is Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45
(8th Cir. 1964); cert. granted, 382 U.S. 8o8 (1965). FTC there held that Brown's
franchise program tied its franchise plan to purchases of Brown Shoes and prevented
its franchisees from buying shoes from Brown's competitors, but the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed.
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the competitive consequences of such limitations are not so obvious
nor so easily categorized. A basic objection to territorial restrictions
is that they eliminate competition between the fenced-in franchisees
(sellers). Nevertheless, it is argued, territorial limitations actually im-
prove market performance and foster' competition between the territo-
rially-limited franchisees and competing manufacturers or other fran-
chise operations. Litigated tests of these conflicting assertions, while
not extensive, do afford some insights on appropriate antitrust
standards for territorial limitations.48 First, however, a brief resume of
the key arguments for and against setting fixed bounds to a franchisee's
sales area will give perspective to the developing case law.
It is obvious that competition is restrained by territorial limita-
tions. Just as an exclusive franchise eliminates the potential intra-
brand competition that another franchisee would represent, so an
effective restriction of exclusive franchisees within non-overlapping
territories eliminates all intra-brand competition. Even where the re-
striction is not completely effective (far whatever reason) or where ex-
clusive franchises are not involved, some intra-brand competition is
eliminated-and indeed that is usually the purpose of the restriction.
Equally obvious, intra-brand competition can constitute, at least
in the short term, a most important stimulus to overall market price
competition. For as a general matter, a seller must either cut prices
or otherwise shave his net return to increase his sales in competition
against sellers of same-brand products. In a reasonably competitive
market, intra-brand price cutting will induce inter-brand price compe-
tition as well. The intra-brand competition, including cut-price com-
petition, often benefits a franchisor by increasing his total sales and
maximizing his market coverage, and it may boost his franchisees' com-
petitive positions as well. The inter-brand competition may also tend
to expand total product sales as well as maximize consumer want satis-
faction.
Such, even so, are only some of the effects of intra-brand competi-
tion. While expanding sales for one franchisee, intra-brand competi-
tion may shrink another franchisee's sales proportionally, especially in
a relatively static product market. And this effect, particularly in the
LTerritorial restraint cases or problems often may involve other sorts of
restrictions, e.g., exclusive franchises, customer restrictions, or efforts to maintain
resale prices, the lawfulness of which depends on a basically different analysis,
of market foreclosure, or per se combination or conspiracy. The effort to generalize
rules to cover practices so diverse in purpose and use actually tends to exaggerate
legal uncertainty. In a specific factual context, to the contrary, probably most ter-
ritorial limitations can be readily appraised under antitrust standards.
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long-run, may prevent or stifle market competition by frustrating the
growth of strong unified franchise systems.
The important impetus to market competition that territorially
limited franchises can provide is most usually exampled by the manu-
facturer trying to break into the market with a new product. He may
find it difficult to get franchisees willing to invest in building outlets,
adding to existing facilities, or paying for advertising and other pro-
motional activities unless there is some certainty of adequate financial
reward if the product is successful. But the manufacturer who finds his
existing distribution channels are not effective to maximize sales of his
goods faces similar problems. His efforts to persuade his franchisees to
spend the time, money, and effort needed to build continuing demand
for his product may fail if franchisees from other market areas can cash
in on such efforts without making any comparable investment or work.
Pertinent, too, are service problems. Many service costs are charged
to the customer, but some are not passed on in order to promote
product good will, and to thus strengthen the competitive stature of the
franchise. A cross-selling franchisee may be able to make sales outside
his own territory at cut prices solely because he bears no service bur-
den. When the invaded franchisee is unable or unwilling to give
service on an item he has not sold and on which he has not realized
any sales profit, the franchisee's market position may suffer.
Finally, franchisors plan distribution systems so that franchisees
will develop all accounts in a given market-not just the easier ones.
And since efforts can be concentrated to develop all potential trade
in the limited areas, territorial restrictions should tend to increase the
number of franchisees a franchisor can economically deploy.49 A cross-
selling franchisee can disrupt full market exploitation since he may
find it more profitable to.stick to fewer accounts in his own area if
he takes sales from his neighbor-whereas the franchisee who loses the
"cream" accounts in his territory may find the remaining business in-
sufficiently profitable to be worthwhile. Moreover, the franchisee caught
with an inventory build-up frequently dumps it in somebody else's
market-where it affects somebody else's price structure. By such a
course, the argument goes, franchisees fail, franchisors lose distribu-
tion, and markets become less competitive.
The Justice Department views most of these rationalizations for
territorial restrictions skeptically. Detailed guidelines for such re-
strictions have not yet been published by the Antitrust Division,5 0
4tPreston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public
Policy Standards, 3o Law and Contemporary Problems 5o6 (1965).
wrurner Address, supra note 8.
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but Assistant Attorney General Turner has said that he "approach[es]
territorial and customer restrictions ... inhospitably in the tradition
of antitrust law." 5' 1 Using Addyston Pipe's "ancillary restraint" doc-
trine52 as his guide, the "question... of overriding importance" Mr.
Turner sees is "Are territorial restrictions more restrictive than neces-
sary to achieve any legitimate purpose?" And his "tentative view" is
that there is a "convincing case made for [but one] ... exception... to
a rule of illegality .... that involves the entry of new firms and/or
the introduction of new products," where "territorial restrictions may
be necessary... to induce dealers to make the investment necessary to,
get the manufacturer's new product effectively introduced." Otherwise,
Mr. Turner believes that if a
dealer.., is charging too high a price, normally he should be
undersold [by a cross-selling dealer]. If he cannot survive on the
remaining business, what reason is there to keep him in? ...
[Even] where... territorial restrictions ... appear to be the only
method by which a weak firm can "obtain dealers, ... I am not at
all sure that it is good antitrust policy to attempt to preserve
in this way companies that have run the competitive race and
have been fairly beaten.
It would be easy to exaggerate the disparity between Mr. Turner's
generalized views on enforcement policy and traditional Sherman Act
"rule of reason" analysis which relies on evidence of the restriction's
purpose, market share data, availability of competitive outlets and
products, and other such measures to determine whether a restraint has
sufficient anticompetitive impact to be ruled unlawful. Mr. Turner
seems to suggest that courts should presume that territorial restrictions
are an unreasonable interference with competition, an arguably strict-
er standard for restraints of intra-brand competition than that applied
to some inter-brand restraints.
[W]hen it is demonstrable that the agreements are in any
event serving no useful purpose that cannot be served by less
restrictive arrangements ... restraint[s] as anticompetitive in ...
terms as territorial restraints ... are ... commonly if not usually
employed primarily because of the benefits which the end-
ing of competition will confer on the parties concerned ...
should be held unlawful without more.5
5Address by Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law Section of the New York State
Bar Association, February 2, 1966.
r'Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 Fed. 271, aff'd 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
51See also Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Con-
scious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 698-99 (1962).
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A more particularized application of this general theory may shortly
be available when the Antitrust Division's guidelines are released. It
is interesting, even without the more precise standards, to review some
of the territorial restriction cases with this generalized theory in mind.
The Philco suit5 4 though not recent, provides a cornerstone theory
in this field. In that case, terminated by a consent judgment, the com-
plaint had charged a well-policed conspiracy between Philco and its
wholesale distributors to prevent cross-selling between fixed wholesale
distribution territories and to eliminate sales to unapproved retail
outlets. The consented-to judgment set a pattern consistent with Mr.
Turner's thesis by providing that "Philco may... designate geographi-
cal areas in which [its] ... distributors shall respectively be primarily
responsible for wholesaling Philco products and ... terminate the fran-
chises of distributors who do not adequately represent Philco and
promote the sale of all Philco products in areas so designated as their
primary responsibility."
More recent cases illustrate possible consequences of designating
territorial limitations more stringent than areas of "primary responsi-
bility." Of these, White MotorN5 is the key "vertical" case. The Dis-
trict Court on motion for summary judgment held that the provisions
of White's dealer contracts requiring its dealers to maintain resale
prices and forbidding them to sell outside certain territories or to
customers White reserved for itself, were per se unlawful. White did
not contest the price-fixing holding but appealed on the territorial
and customer limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
"summary judgment, apart from the price-fixing phase of the case, was
improperly employed in this suit.... We only hold that the legality
of the territorial and customer limitations should be determined only
after a trial."5 6
White had justified its restrictions to the Supreme Court on argu-
ments similar to those mentioned above. It pointed to the strong com-
petition it faced and argued that if it was to obtain maximum sales in
a given area its distributors and dealers had to concentrate on trying
to take sales away from other competing truck manufacturers rather
than from each other. "The plain fact is," White argued,
'United States v. Philco Corp., Civil Action 18216, E.D. Pa., Final Judgment
filed on July 13, 1956, paragraph IV (D). A summary of cases challenging terri-
torial limitations brought by the Department of Justice and terminated by con-
sent judgments is given in Timberg, op. cit. supra note 3.
'United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd,
372 U.S. 253 (1963).
cWhite Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963).
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as we expect to be able to show to the satisfaction of the Court
at a trial of this case on the merits, that the outlawing of ex-
clusive distributorships and dealerships in specified territories
would reduce competition in the sale of motor trucks and not
foster such competition.57
The majority of the Supreme Court recognized this as "the first
case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement;" and
said:
Horizontal territorial limitations, like "group boycotts, or
concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders" ... are
naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of com-
petition. A vertical territorial limitation may or may not have
that purpose or effect. We do not know enough of the economic
and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to
be certain. They may be too dangerous to sanction or they may
be allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the
only practicable means a small company has for breaking into
or staying in business . . . and within the "rule of reason."
We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of
these arrangements on competition to decide whether they have
such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack any redeem-
ing virtue" ... and therefore should be classified as per se vio-
lations of the Sherman Act.58
Like the majority, Mr. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion,
was unwilling to assume "without a trial" that vertical "restraints serve
the same pernicious purpose and have the same inhibitory effects upon
competition as -horizontal division of markets....-59 Neither would
he accept as valid the equation of resale price maintenance, which re-
duces both intra-brand and inter-brand competition, with territorial
restrictions which though reducing intra-brand competition could
have quite different effects on inter-brand competition. Mr. justice
Brennan clearly shares the concern that territorial restrictions should
not exceed their justification. "The problem," Mr. Justice Brennan
pointed out,
'id. at 257.
581d. at 262. In dissent (p. 281), Mr. Justice Clark, writing for himself, the
Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Black, pointed out that the rule of reason "is in-
applicable to agreements made solely for the purpose of eliminating competition....
The offered justification must fail because it involves a contention contrary to the
public policy of the Sherman Act, which is that the suppression of competition is
in and of itself a public injury. To admit, as does the petitioner, that competition
is eliminated under its contracts is, under our cases, to admit a violation of the
Sherman Act. No justification, no matter how beneficial, can save it from that
interdiction."
1Id. at 267.
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is not simply whether some justification can be found, but
whether the restraint so justified is more restrictive than neces-
say, or excessively anticompetitive, when viewed in light of the
extenuating interests.60
But, in Mr. Justice Brennan's view, "no. . . inquiry.., into the ques-
tion of [less restrictive] alternatives could meaningfully be under-
taken until the District Court has ascertained the effect upon compe-
tition of the particular territorial restraints in suit, and of the par-
ticular sanctions by which they are enforced."'61
After that opinion, antitrust lawyers waited, as one of them put it,
for "the other shoe to drop."6 2 But White eliminated its challenged
restrictions and the case was ended by a consent judgment. Other cases
decided after White offer some instruction on facts lower courts feel
may justify territorial restrictions, suggesting when such restrictions
may be, to use Mr. Justice Douglas' phrase, "allowable protections
against aggressive competitors."
The Snap-On Tools case63 was a proceeding under FTC Act Sec-
tion 5 against a manufacturer of a complete line of tools, ranging
from small wrenches and pliers to a line of electric devices and auto-
mobile testing equipment. The complaint charged that Snap-on: (i)
maintained resale prices; (2) restricted the territory within which and
the persons to whom its dealers could sell; and (3) required those of
its dealers who ceased to represent Snap-On to agree not to engage
in a similar business within the same state for a period of one year.
The Commission, reversing its Hearing Examiner,64 found that the
provision for exclusive territories "was part of the over-all distri-
bution plan which encompassed all of the restrictions here involved
and was designed to prevent competition among its dealers. More spe-
cifically, exclusive territories buttressed the resale price maintainance
provision by preventing all competition, including price competition,
"Id. at 270. Mr. Justice Brennan wanted to know, for instance, what sanctions
White imposed against distributors who raided other territories, pointing out that
if the dealer who cross-sells took the chance of losing his franchise altogether the
restrictions might well completely deter competitive efforts.
"nId. at 272.
"-Potvin, Choosing and Dropping Distributors, 26 A.B.A. Anti-Trust Section 99,
1oo (1964).
3FTC Docket 7116; rev'd, Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.
1)63).
OThe Hearing Examiner originally held that a prima facie case had been
made only on the price maintenance charge and dismissed the other charges. In
reversing, the Commission directed the Examiner to evaluate the company's entire
course of dealing. After a further hearing, the Examiner once again dismissed
without considering the practices as a unitary course of action.
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among respondent's dealers." 63 Snap-On's legitimate ends, the Com-
mission pointed out, could be met "without suppressing or eliminat-
ing competition among its dealers" by "assigning areas of primary re-
sponsibility to its dealers and insisting that they provide adequate sales
coverage and service within these territories." 66
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence did not
support the finding of price-fixing and that none of the other re-
straints, viewed separately on the record, was unreasonable. The ter-
ritorial restrictions were reasonable, in the Court's view, because of
the importance of service to Snap-On's business and the great difficul-
ties of providing adequate service without limited territories. More-
over, the Court emphasized that there were no facts which suggested
that Snap-On's territorial arrangement was adopted by the company
and its dealers in order to limit competition. Perhaps the key to the
decision, however, was the Court's judgment that Snap-On had no
monopoly position in the tool business and had no patents or trade
secrets which give them a dominant position:
Rather the evidence is that there are over eighty competing
concerns in the hand tool industry and that "competitive con-
ditions in the Hand Tools Industry are bitter and bloody."
67
The Commission's conclusion that assignment of areas of "primary
responsibility" would provide satisfactory less restrictive alternatives
to the exclusive territories was summarily rejected.
An FTC decision that territorial limitations upon Sandura Com-
pany's floor covering distributors violated Section 5 of the FTC Act was
recently reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.68 Here, too,
the Commission had found the territorial restrictions part of an
overall price-fixing scheme, but the court found this conclusion un-
supported by the record. 69 Moreover, the Court was convinced that
Sandura had to adopt closed territories to get adequate distribution
in the face of strong competition from the "giants" of the floor cover-
ing industry. When Sandura had first marketed its newly developed
"Sandran," it encountered product failures which nearly forced it into
bankruptcy and demoralized its distribution organization. Testi-
mony in the record, the Court felt, showed the unwillingness of deal-
0Opinion of the Commission, 1961-63 CCH Tr. Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder, FTC
Complaints, etc., 15,546. "The law is clear," the Commission pointed out, "that the
public is entitled to the benefit of competition on the dealer level."
6Ibid.
6Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, supra note 63, at 833.
"Dockett 7042; rev'd, Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
OSandura did not appeal the resale price-fixing finding.
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ers to make the investment necessary to handle Sandura's products
without closed territories. Without the intra-brand restraint, it ap-
peared, the market might well have lost a significant competitive
innovator.
Not only was Sandura's distributorship organization lawfully con-
ceived, the court found, but Sandura's dependence on its distributors
for advertising and promotion justified continuance of the closed
territory s) stem:
It is axiomatic that no purpose, however reasonable, may be
used to justify a restraint of trade greater than the minimum
necessary to reasonably attain it. Accordingly if it were possible
to accept the finding that Sandura could achieve at least its
present valid purposes by establishing merely de facto closed ter-
ritories through use of "primary-responsibility" exclusive ter-
ritories. the Commission's order should be enforced. We be-
lieve, however, that the Commission was not justified in its re-
jection of the great body of uncontradicted testimony that the
distributors would not have been willing to undertake the
Sandura program without closed territories and would either
drop the line or greatly alter their methods if deprived of
their closed territories today.
70
Cases challenging franchise restrictions employed by Arnold,
Schwirn 8 Co., General Motors, and Sealy, Inc. may be noted here
for the additional light they give on some aspects of the Government's
views on territorial restrictions. Extended comment at this juncture on
those cases, however, would be premature, since all three are presently
on appeal to the Supreme Court.71
Schwinn was rather a stand-off in the District Court, where it was
held that Schwinn and certain of its distributors had participated in
a horizontal conspiracy to allocate sales territories among the dis-
tributors. On the other hand, the vertical features of Schwinn's rather
complex franchising arrangement, whereby Schwinn distributors sold
to Schwinn-franchised retail outlets only were upheld.72 On appeal,
analogizing Schwinn's customer restrictions to territorial restraints,
the Government stressed the need for intra-brand competition in "in-
-Sandura Co. v. FTC, supra note 68, at 856.
nSee note 7, supra. GM was argued on December 9, 1965. Argument in the Sealy
and Schwinn cases, however, may go over to next term.
7Schwinn, the District Court held, had laid out the territories unilaterally
"one distributor for a general area, and one retail dealer for a particular locality....
All of which," the Court found, "is sound economically and perfectly legal." United
States v. Schwinn, supra note 4, at 340. Despite the conspiracy violation, Judge
Perry found "no grounds whatsoever for ordering or directing Schwinn to alter
or change its territories or distributors." Id. at 342.
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dustries in which products are highly differentiated... [and] like
Schwinn bicycles... [have] a market of... [their] own," particularly
when "intra-brand competitive efforts... may be essential to promote
competition between brands and to hinder the tendency toward ac-
commodation among the few manufacturers."7 -3 Moreover, the anti-
trust agency suggested in a footnote that the "burden was upon
Schwinn to show that the restraint was needed to maintain Schwinn as
a competitive bicycle manufacturer, and this it failed to do."
74
Territorial limitations of the sort here previously discussed were
not involved in United States v. General Motors, for GM's Los Angeles
Chevrolet dealers there involved were free to sell to any customer, at
any price, anywhere. 75 The complaint in that case, which charged
that GVI and its Los Angeles dealers had conspired to suppress com-
petition by preventing sales of Chevrolets through discount houses
and referral services, was dismissed by the District Court after trial
oriented mainly on a "group boycott" theory. In the Supreme Court
appeal the Government's principal atfack was against General Motors'
disapproval of dealer sales through discount house and referral ar-
rangements, on the basis of a clause in its franchise contract forbidding
the franchisee to establish unauthorized branch locations. The Dis-
trict Court had found that GM had adopted the "location" clause as a
key part of its franchise system to insure adequate distribution and
servicing for its products, thus promoting competition. The Court
found, too, that intra-brand competition involved 85 Chevrolet dealers
in the Los Angeles area.
While accepting for the purposes of argument the principle that
some vertically imposed "restrictions on distribution 'may ... be rea-
sonable," the Antitrust Division argued that "the presumption should
be against... vertical restraints... shown to be anticompetitive in
nature," and "that it is incumbent upon those manufacturers employ-
ing ... [such restraints] to prove that they are necessary to promote or
preserve competition, and no more restrictive in nature or in dura-
tion that conditions require."76 Arguments like those made in Schwinn
"United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., supra note 4, Government's Jurisdic-
tional Statement, p. 14. The appeal also challenges- the proposition that otherwise in-
valid territorial and customer restrictions could be properly used in the context
of agency or consignment arrangements.
"'Id. at 15, n.15. In its motion to affirm the District Court, Schwinn argued
strongly in opposition to these propositions, stressing that the Government's prose-
cution in the District Court postulated no such theory of its cage. and that the
record below would not support it.
'United States v. General Motors Corp., supra note 7.
"United States v. General Motors Corp., supra note 7, Brief for the United
States, at 19-2o.
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stressed the importance of intra-brand competition in light of "the
position of General Motors in the automobile industry" and the
significance of the Chevrolet brand, "in its own right a very signif-
icant and important product market," and suggested that preventing
sales through discount houses had a "direct and immediate depressant
effect... upon price competition among Chevrolet dealers."7 7 GM's
position, to the contrary, was that even if the location clause had been
challenged in the District Court, the facts of record showed the branch
location restriction was essential to an efficient and competitive fran-
chise organization.
Whether territorial restraints on sales of trademarked "Sealy"
mattresses are horizontal or vertical (or if horizontal should be treated
as vertical) was the liminal issue in United States v. Sealy.78 The Anti-
trust Division, noting that Sealy, Inc., the corporate title holder to
the trademark, is 98 percent owned by the licensees among whom the
U. S. Market is divided, stated flatly that the territorial allocation was a
horizontal market division and per se unlawful. The District Court re-
jected this analysis, holding that the territorial allocation was not
designed to eliminate competition but to afford a basis for proper
exploitation of the Sealy name and trademarks, and thus under the
Addyston rule merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful con-
tract.7 9 There was evidence offered to show vigorous competition in
the bedding industry, and the need for Sealy franchisees to under-
take expensive promotion and advertising to build market demand for
their products in competition with heavily advertised and promoted
national brand rivals.
While the extent to which coherent territorial restriction rules
can be derived is qualified by the important and possibly broad-
reaching questions posed in cases now on appeal before the Supreme
Court, ceratin principles seem reasonably clear:
(i) Franchises set up on the basis of "areas of primary responsibil-
ity" are presumably lawful.80
(2) Horizontal territorial arrangements among franchisees are gen-
erally per se unlawful.8 '
MId. at 20, 23, 24.
8Supra note 7.
'United States v. Sealy, Inc., 1964 CCH Tr. Cas. 75,258 (E.D. Ii. 1964).
IOUnited States v. Philco, supra note 54; Snap-On Tools (Commission Decision),
supra note 65; Turner, op. cit. supra note 53, at 699.
bWhite Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 56; Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. v. United States, supra note 52; Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., supra note 4.
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(3) vertically imposed territorial limitations are not per se un-
lawful.82 The burden of proof plaintiff bears to make a prima facie
case cannot be generalized, but could encompass, inter alia, evidence
relating to (i) unlawful purpose or motive (thus the restriction would
not be "ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract");8 3 (2)
the existence and substance of both inter-brand and intra-brand com-
petition in the product market affected;8 4 and (3) the effectiveness of
the restrictions halting intra-brand competition and the character of
the sanctions imposed to enforce those restrictions.85 Mere proof of
the existence of territorial restrictions would not likely suffice.
(4) Justification of territorial limitations most usually will depend
on a factual showing of the franchisor's need for such restrictions to
gain, retain, or operate within a competitive marketing position. Where
the proven need arises in connection with a franchisor's entry into
a new market or his introduction of new products, such restrictions
should not be challenged.8 6 Further, where the company imposing
territorial limitations faces much larger and more powerful competi-
tors,8 7 in an industry where inter-brand competition is strong,88 it
is not unlikely that use of territorial restrictions will continue to be
permissible, particularly where their use can be shown to expand or
protect the franchisor's competitive position. s9 Testimony by fran-
chisors and franchisees (dealers), supported by other extrinsic evi-
dence of purpose and need, should be persuasive.90 There seems
to be no valid reason why the lawfulness of territorial limitations in
'White Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 56.
'lAn example might be a franchisor's adoption of territorial limitations worked
out by his franchisees.
"Plaintiff would be expected to stress, where appropriate, defendant's substan-
tial market share, his mature and extensive franchise organization, and the separate-
ness of the market for the territorially limited brand, such as, "Chevrolet" or
"Schwinn."
IGSee text supra at note 61.
86'urner, supra, text at note 51.
'E.g., as in Snap-On Tools Corp v. FTC, supra note 63; Sandura Co. v. FTC,
supra note 68.
wIbid.
'Cf. Preston, supra note 49. Legislation has been proposed under which "a
contract ... restricting the right of the purchaser to the distribution of the supplier's
product within a clearly delineated territorial area shall not in and of itself be
deemed to be an unfair method of competition...." or otherwise in violation
of the Sherman or FTC Acts, if specified competitive market circumstances are ful-
filled. S. 2549, 89 th Cong., ist Sess. The future of this bill depends on the outcome
of the cases now before the U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 7. See also H.R. 4862,
89th Cong., tst Sess.
I'Sandura Co. v. FTC, supra note 68. But see Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1679, 168o
(1965).
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a trademark-based franchise should not be judged according to such
standards, regardless of whether the limitations are vertical or hori-
zontal in form.91
(5) Whether the franchisor could achieve his legitimate ends by
less restrictive arrangements, such as assignment of "areas of primary
responsibility," is a relevant inquiry and may be controlling, particu-
larly where the franchisor's justification is otherwise vulnerable. 92
(6) Territorial restrictions are most likely to be attacked when the
franchise program also embodies price maintenance activities,93 but
a price fixing violation does not render the entire franchise program
unlawful.
94
(7) Treble damage problems arising from territorial limitations
may be troublesome, especially where franchisee termination is in-
volved.95
The search for simple, definite, and unchanging rules which are
certain in their application to territorial limitations is likely to be
unavailing. For, to borrow Mr. Frost's words, the "Something...
that doesn't love a wall" is constant. The circumstances under which
"'Good fences make good neighbors'" change.96
CONCLUSION
As Chairman Dixon stated last year to Senator Hart's Subcommit-
tee:
"Where franchising has an over-all effect of increasing compe-
"'This is at least arguable on the basis of Mr. Turner's speech, supra note 51.
But see The Gray Line, Inc. v. Gray Line Sightseeing Companies Associated, Inc.
(N.D. Cal. 1966) 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 71,704, holding a trademark-based terri-
torial agreement illegal per se.
"White Motor Co. v. United States, supra note 56, at 264 (concurring opinion);
Sandura Co. v. FTC, supra note 68.
'Price-fixing charges were an important element in the White, Snap-On, San-
dura, Schwinn and Philco cases.
'Chairman Dixon, testifying before the Hart Subcommittee on March 4,
1965, stated that White stands for "several important propositions concerning
franchises: (a) restrictive provisions regarding territorial and customer division
do not of themselves render a franchise program illegal; (b) the legality of verti-
cal integration by contract, including franchise systems, can be determined only
in the context of the factual background of the industry concerned; (c) insofar
as a franchise system may result in horizontal price-fixing, it falls under the pro-
hibition of Section i of the Sherman Act, but this does not mean that the entire
program is necessarily unlawful." Hearings, supra note 2, at 82.
'Cf. Simpson v. Union Oil Co-, 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
""'Mending Wall" from Complete Poems of Robert Frost 47 (Henry Holt & Co.
Inc. 193o).
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tition or has no significant effect on competition, the law will
not interfere with franchising operations."
97
That statement, of course, gives small comfort to those whose franchise
arrangements may be challenged, but it suggests that normal enforce-
ment attitude toward franchise restrictions is to require factual analysis
of their competitive effects. One can anticipate, of course, different
views on the "over-all effect" particular franchising systems have
(witness Sandura and Snap-On), and, as well, on the lawfulness of
specific "tying" or "territorial" restraints. But Supreme Court review
and Justice Department guidelines likely will bring some of the
principal issues into sharper focus, and more clearly indicate some of
the reasons why and occasions where territorial and purchasing re-
strictions may be properly employed in franchising systems.
9'Hearings, supra note 2, at 85. Chairman Dixon suggested that uncertainty
about enforcement intentions can be reduced by asking for a Commission Advisory
opinion. (Ibid.).
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